As fighting involving Iran intensifies, governments in the Gulf are increasingly looking to China rather than the United States to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on Tehran to keep critical sea lanes open. The renewed push reflects frustration in Gulf capitals at the disruption of energy exports and the growing direct threat to their shipping posed by Iranian forces and allied militias, regional sources say.
The conflict, which began with U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, has hurt Iran but also constrained vital energy shipments from the region and, to varying extents, placed Gulf states in the line of fire. With threats emerging to both the Bab el-Mandeb strait in the southern Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf officials have sought a stronger Chinese role to help de-escalate and restore maritime security, three regional sources told reporters.
China has responded with a flurry of diplomatic activity. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held numerous calls and meetings with regional counterparts pressing for a new ceasefire, and special envoy Zhai Jun has travelled to Gulf capitals as well as to Tehran for talks. The Chinese foreign ministry said: "China has maintained close communication with all parties, and has consistently worked to stop the fighting and promote peace."
Economic leverage and political sensitivity
China is both a major purchaser of Gulf oil and Iran’s largest trading partner, a dual position that provides leverage but also requires careful handling. One Gulf source described relations with Beijing as respectful and discreet, saying that matters are raised "in a very quiet manner." That discretion reflects the balancing act Beijing faces between the Gulf states and Tehran.
Gulf governments hope Beijing can nudge Tehran toward negotiation and a settlement. At the same time, they recognise that China often acts cautiously and incrementally. A prolonged conflict may also align with some Chinese interests by increasing pressure on the United States, according to one regional source, underscoring the complex incentives involved.
Constraints on China’s influence
China has deepened trade and investment ties with the six Gulf Cooperation Council members - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - since a Gulf-China summit in 2022, and another summit is planned this year in Riyadh though not confirmed. Yet public Chinese responses to Tehran’s threats against shipping have been limited, causing doubts in the Gulf about how far Beijing will go to protect regional seaways and exports.
One Gulf source said: "The Chinese are trying to be more involved, they are trying to be more helpful. But China has turned out not to be as influential as we thought - whether that is a lack of will or a lack of capacity is debatable." The source added that when the United States becomes directly involved, "superpower calculations dominate over everything else."
Henry Tugendhat, a China specialist at the Washington Institute, observed that Beijing’s primary objective has been to preserve relationships across the region rather than risk diplomatic fallout by overtly taking sides. Once Washington entered the crisis, China’s strategic considerations expanded beyond regional ties to factor in broader rivalry and relations with the United States. A source with direct knowledge of China’s discussions said Gulf states can buy technology, investment and military hardware from China, but they cannot purchase Chinese influence that is independent of Beijing’s broader relationship with Washington.
President Xi Jinping is expected to be in the United States for talks with President Donald Trump on September 24, and Chinese officials have put forward a four-point proposal to safeguard and promote peace and stability in the Middle East, together with backing for regional development, security and cooperation, the foreign ministry said.
Diplomatic initiatives and bilateral arrangements
China has used its economic weight to expand its diplomatic role in the Middle East, including brokering the Saudi-Iran diplomatic rapprochement in 2023. Beijing has also encouraged third-party mediation - reportedly pressing Pakistan to help mediate between Washington and Tehran for renewed peace talks, according to Pakistani sources.
In addition, Chinese officials have engaged directly with Yemen’s Houthi movement. According to multiple sources, Beijing has held talks with the Iran-aligned militia with the aim of enabling Chinese-affiliated tankers to transit the southern Red Sea without being attacked after the Houthis pledged to obstruct access to Saudi ports. China’s transport ministry did not respond to a request for comment on these discussions.
Observers note that the most tangible outcome of Chinese diplomacy so far has been narrow bilateral arrangements that provide limited shielding for ships linked to China. Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said these arrangements are the "only visible outcome" of Beijing’s efforts to date, and argued that more sweeping pressure to end attacks has not materialised.
China’s military posture and transactional ties
Analysts and sources interviewed emphasise that Beijing’s approach is shaped by a long-standing preference for transactional partnerships based on trade, investment and arms sales rather than binding defence commitments. Unlike the United States, which has alliance structures tied to mutual defence, China has no defence treaties in the Gulf, no military mandate to secure regional waterways, and little inclination to assume such commitments.
Beijing has stated that it is not prepared to use military force to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and does not believe other parties can do so. The official line has been to call for diplomacy, dialogue and measures to ensure the safety and free flow of international shipping routes.
China has also benefitted commercially from deep discounts on Iranian oil, a by-product of international sanctions on Tehran. Over recent years, Beijing has reportedly increased support for Iranian security through dual-use components, chip equipment and satellite navigation systems while denying that it has provided overt military aid since the outbreak of the current war. Since the conflict began, Chinese authorities have consistently rebutted media reports alleging transfers of chips, intelligence or defence systems to Iran, describing Beijing’s policy as "above board and straightforward" and saying it has not "added fuel to the fire."
Limited protective effect and remaining uncertainty
Sources familiar with China’s dealings said the transactional arrangements between Beijing and the Houthis have largely kept Chinese-linked vessels out of immediate danger, but have not produced broad pressure on the militias to stop all attacks. This mirrors Chinese actions during earlier Houthi attacks on ships in 2023-2024, when protective measures were selective rather than systemic.
Gulf officials continue to weigh Beijing’s usefulness against the reality that once the United States becomes engaged, superpower strategic calculations can overshadow regional diplomacy. The limits of China’s influence, the absence of formal security guarantees, and the pace of Beijing’s diplomatic interventions leave open significant uncertainties for energy markets and shipping lines dependent on the two threatened chokepoints.
For Gulf states, the diplomatic mix involves pressing China to use its unique economic linkages with Iran to press for de-escalation while acknowledging that Beijing’s actions will be calibrated against its broader strategic relationship with Washington and its own cautious approach to foreign military commitments.
Reporting for this analysis drew on interviews with regional officials, analysts and public statements from Chinese authorities reflecting official diplomatic activity and positions relayed by those sources.