Newly shared data from the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) indicates a marked shift in Russian targeting of Ukraine's power network toward smaller distribution substations, as the attacker’s drone capacity and operational tempo have increased. Analysts say the trend has contributed to more sustained disruptions of power and heat for civilians, businesses and the military during recent winter months.
The CIR dataset, based on geolocated and verified video evidence collected by its researchers, mapped 270 confirmed strikes. CIR's analysis found that, of the incidents it verified between October 2025 and April 2026, 58% struck small substations - facilities that primarily distribute electricity to local consumers. That figure represents a sharp rise from the 31% share of small-substation strikes observed in the same months the prior year.
Ukraine's defence ministry reported that between November 2025 and March 2026 more than 1,000 missiles and 27,000 Shahed-type drones were launched against the country. CIR did not categorise the specific weapon used in each verified hit, but Ukrainian officials say drones are the main instrument deployed against smaller distribution points, rather than the more expensive missile systems.
"Before 2025, it was necessary to partially stockpile the drones in order to amass sufficient volume to overwhelm air defence," said Joshua Scriven, an investigator on CIR's Eyes on Russia team. "But now, with the average day in Ukraine seeing over a hundred such drones fired into the country, Russian forces have more latitude in target selection." He and other CIR analysts describe a pattern in which major, high-impact strikes continue to hit large generation and transmission assets, while smaller drone waves sent on other days concentrate on distribution substations.
Ukraine's GUR defence intelligence agency said the attacks often combine hundreds of drones with dozens of missiles in single waves, and that the campaign has targeted both power generation facilities and the transmission grid. CIR's assessment aligns with that picture, noting that lower-volume drone waves in the intervals between major attacks frequently strike facilities that feed electricity to local areas.
Protection of the grid has proven challenging. Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Research Centre in Kyiv, highlighted the scale of the defence problem: roughly 115 to 120 high-voltage substations sit at the core of the system, but more than 3,000 smaller transformers provide distribution services to consumers. Given limited air-defence resources, authorities prioritise large, strategic facilities and struggle to shield the many smaller nodes.
The human and economic costs are substantial. World Bank estimates attribute about $25 billion in damage to Ukraine's energy sector from the bombardment, and place the broader rebuilding and recovery bill for the sector at more than $90 billion. During the most recent winter campaign, which analysts call the largest of the full-scale war, attacks knocked out power for residents in major cities for prolonged stretches - up to 18 hours a day during unusually cold conditions.
Russia's defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the CIR data. Official Russian statements deny that civilians are being deliberately targeted, and argue that strikes on civilian energy infrastructure are aimed at degrading Ukraine's military capability. Kyiv, meanwhile, characterises such attacks as war crimes.
CIR investigators stress that hitting distribution substations does not typically cause cascading failures across the entire national grid, but it can generate significant local outages, affecting tens of thousands of people in a given area. "Striking distribution substations isn’t going to have a large-scale impact on the wider grid, but it can certainly cause issues at the local level," Scriven said.
The shift in tactics reflects a broader change in the dynamics of aerial campaigns: as domestic drone production has expanded and sorties have become routine, Russian forces are able to sustain frequent, diverse strike packages. The resulting pattern alternates high-profile attacks on major assets with lower-volume drone waves that target widespread, smaller infrastructure points.
For Ukraine, the evolving threat raises questions about how to allocate scarce air-defence resources between protecting large, strategic assets and guarding the vast number of smaller distribution facilities that directly affect civilian life and local economies. The CIR data provides a granular look at the changing targeting mix, but it does not assign weapon types to every verified strike.
The combined effect of these strikes - large-scale missile and drone waves interwoven with repeated hits on distribution infrastructure - has produced sustained hardship for residential customers and businesses and added a substantial financial burden to the sector's recovery.
Summary
Data from the Centre for Information Resilience shows Russia has increasingly struck small Ukrainian power substations as domestic drone production and sortie rates have risen. Verified CIR evidence indicates the share of attacks hitting smaller distribution sites rose to 58% from October 2025 to April 2026, compared with 31% in the same months a year earlier. Ukraine faces protection challenges due to the large number of small transformers versus limited air-defence assets, while economic damages to the energy sector are estimated at about $25 billion, with recovery costs exceeding $90 billion.