The United States and Saudi Arabia announced a civilian nuclear cooperation pact that permits the kingdom to both enrich uranium and build nuclear reactors using U.S. technology, while stopping short of a commitment to the so-called Additional Protocol that would allow the U.N. agency to conduct snap inspections at undeclared sites.
The agreement, described by U.S. officials as a 123 Agreement, was signed by U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and his Saudi counterpart Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman alongside a bilateral safeguards arrangement, the U.S. Energy Department said. The administration said the pact also abides by nonproliferation requirements set out in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.
Negotiations on a civil nuclear framework with Saudi Arabia have spanned multiple U.S. administrations but have not reached agreement until now. Observers and nonproliferation organizations have warned that allowing enrichment and reprocessing activity could create pathways to a nuclear weapon; those warnings figured prominently in the public debate over the pact.
More than a year ago, Saudi Arabia moved from what has been described as light-touch International Atomic Energy Agency oversight - a model intended for states with very limited nuclear activity - to regular safeguards that include monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Saudi officials have long indicated that the planned expansion of their nuclear program would include enrichment capabilities.
Key to international safeguards is the Additional Protocol, which is intended to protect against undeclared nuclear activities by permitting the IAEA to carry out short-notice, or snap, inspections at sites not previously declared. Concerns about clandestine activity have been sharpened by repeated public statements from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that Riyadh would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran did.
The record on the Additional Protocol in the region is mixed. Iran implemented the Additional Protocol as part of the 2015 nuclear deal with major powers, but that agreement unraveled after the United States withdrew in 2018. Iran ceased implementing the Additional Protocol in 2023.
The new U.S.-Saudi accord, unlike a plan floated under the Biden administration, does not require Saudi Arabia to sign the Additional Protocol. The White House said the 123 Agreement allows enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear waste - activities that are also potential routes to weapons development. By contrast, when the United Arab Emirates signed a similar agreement with the United States in 2009, it agreed to forgo both enrichment and reprocessing.
Industry and political implications were noted immediately. The roughly 30-year construction arrangement for AP1000 reactors is valued at tens of billions of dollars and would provide a substantial contract for Westinghouse, which is jointly owned by Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management, according to the announcement.
An industry source said the accord contains a requirement for a feasibility study on using U.S. technology in Saudi Arabia. That study, coupled with the inherently slow pace of developing nuclear power plants and enrichment infrastructure, means the physical build-out could take many years.
Politically, the agreement now moves to Congress. Under the statutory process, unless members of Congress raise sufficient votes to object within 90 session days, the agreement will go into force. Overriding a presidential veto, should one occur, would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers.
Some nonproliferation experts and lawmakers urged defeat or modification of the pact. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, said, "We urge all members of Congress on both sides of the aisle to recognize the risks and to exercise their power to reject or modify Trump’s proposed nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia so as not to open the door for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East even wider."
Several Democratic lawmakers cautioned that the deal could trigger a regional arms race as hostilities involving Iran continue. Senator Edward Markey, a Democrat, warned, "They are allowing Saudi Arabia, a belligerent and authoritarian nation, to develop nuclear weapons technologies while starting a war with Iran under the guise of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb. This deal would make us all less safe."
Not all commentary was critical. Senator Jim Risch, a Republican, expressed agreement with the Saudi crown prince that the pact offers mutual benefits for the two countries.
The IAEA had not issued a public comment at the time of the U.S. announcement. Saudi officials have previously indicated that if a partnership with the United States was not attainable they might pursue cooperation with other suppliers such as China or Russia, which operate under different proliferation standards.
Summary
The United States and Saudi Arabia have signed a 123 Agreement permitting uranium enrichment and reactor construction using U.S. technology but not committing Saudi Arabia to the IAEA Additional Protocol. The pact includes a bilateral safeguards agreement, must clear a congressional review window, and could lead to a multidecade construction program centered on AP1000 reactors.
Key points
- The deal allows Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and reprocess nuclear waste under U.S. technology arrangements - actions the UAE had waived in its 2009 pact.
- The agreement does not obligate Saudi Arabia to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol for snap inspections, a core tool for detecting undeclared activities.
- Commercially, the proposed 30-year AP1000 reactor program, worth tens of billions of dollars, would be a major contract for Westinghouse and related supply chains - impacting energy, construction, and industrial manufacturing sectors.
Risks and uncertainties
- Proliferation risk: Allowing enrichment and reprocessing creates technical pathways commonly cited as sensitive by nonproliferation experts - a concern for regional security and defense markets.
- Political and legislative risk: The agreement faces a congressional review period during which lawmakers could block it; legislative outcomes would affect defense, diplomatic, and technology-export sectors.
- Implementation timeline risk: A required feasibility study and the slow pace of nuclear infrastructure development mean material construction and technology deployment could take many years, affecting contractors, suppliers, and financing arrangements.