The Strait of Hormuz connects the oil- and gas-producing states of the Gulf to the wider world. It normally carries about one-fifth of global energy supplies, but has been made hazardous for the tankers that move slowly through its narrow lanes following a surge of Iranian attacks. Those actions were prompted after a U.S.-Israeli strike on February 28 and the killing of Iran's supreme leader, steps Tehran has described as existential and that have led the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to assume a greater operational role.
That shift in Iran's posture helps explain why the country has escalated measures to deny access. Commanders in the Revolutionary Guard have long issued threats about closing the strait, including a widely quoted 2011 remark that doing so would be "easier than drinking a glass of water." Similar warnings surfaced during past tensions over sanctions and the nuclear programme in 2016 and 2018 and again after strikes in the middle of last year. Analysts historically viewed actual closure as a last resort because of the strategic and economic consequences it would bring, including potential retaliation that could harm Iran's own energy sector. The recent attacks and the framing of the conflict by Iranian officials as existential have altered that calculation and prompted more direct action to make the passage unsafe.
The stakes are substantial. The waterway between Iran and Oman is the single sea exit for oil and gas exports from Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Interruptions to flows through the strait already pushed oil prices to their highest levels since 2022 on Monday. Elevated energy prices can feed through to consumer costs and risk reigniting a cost-of-living shock similar to the one seen after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, an outcome highlighted by the United Nations. Beyond hydrocarbons, the strait is also a conduit for critical agricultural inputs; analytics firm Kpler estimates that about 33% of the world’s fertilizers, including sulphur and ammonia, transit the channel. A prolonged closure or severely reduced throughput therefore carries risks for food production and broader economic stability.
Securing the strait is not straightforward. The principal shipping lanes are only two nautical miles wide and require vessels to execute a turn opposite Iranian islands and a rugged coastline. That geography affords cover for forces operating from land and from the many small craft that can operate in shallow waters. While Iran's conventional navy has been described as largely degraded, the Guard retains a portfolio of asymmetric tools: fast-attack craft, mini submarines, naval mines and even small boats or jet skis that can be fitted with explosives. The Centre for Information Resilience estimates Tehran has the industrial capacity to produce around 10,000 drones per month, further complicating efforts to establish uncontested control of the air and sea approaches.
Military planners note that short-term measures to escort ships are technically feasible but resource intensive. Retired Royal Navy commander Tom Sharpe has said that escorting three or four vessels a day could be done in the near term using seven or eight destroyers to provide air cover, depending on whether the threat from mini submarines has been sufficiently reduced. Maintaining such operations for months, however, would require a much larger and sustained allocation of ships, aircraft and sensors. Even the destruction of ballistic missile, drone and floating mine capabilities would not entirely eliminate the threat; experts point out that suicide attacks or other asymmetric tactics would still pose significant danger to escorted vessels.
Historical experience with other regional chokepoints underscores the challenge. Yemen’s Houthi forces, employing a more limited arsenal than Iran, managed to shut down most traffic through the Red Sea for more than two years despite naval efforts by the United States and the European Union. That disruption forced many shipping companies to route around the southern tip of Africa, substantially increasing voyage time and cost. An EU-led mission has had more success in countering piracy off Somalia, but those adversaries lacked the range and lethality of the Guards’ weapon set.
Policymakers are weighing alternatives both at sea and on land, but they are constrained. Some Gulf states have pursued pipeline projects intended to bypass the strait, most notably between the Gulf and the Red Sea, but these are not currently operational and past attacks have shown such land routes remain vulnerable. A 2019 Houthi strike on an east-west Saudi pipeline demonstrated the susceptibility of overland connections to disruption, limiting their immediate utility as a full substitute for maritime transit.
On the diplomatic and operational front, the picture is mixed. The U.S. president has called for allied contributions to reopen the strait and indicated discussions with seven countries about providing naval help. The U.S. administration has also moved to underwrite commercial risks by ordering the International Development Finance Corporation to provide insurance and guarantees for shipping firms. British leadership has engaged at senior levels and London said it is working with partners on options, though the scope and timing of any expanded naval mission remain unsettled.
European responses vary. EU foreign ministers were due to discuss strengthening a modest naval mission tied to protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen’s Houthis, but that effort was not expected to be extended to the Hormuz area. France indicated several European and Asian countries were planning a joint protective mission, but only once active hostilities have ceased. Germany expressed scepticism about expanding effort even in the Red Sea, citing doubts about the current mission’s effectiveness. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan and Australia both publicly stated they were not planning to dispatch vessels to escort shipping in the strait.
Even if a coalition were formed to provide escort and interdiction in the short term, there are practical limits to what can be achieved without a major, sustained military and intelligence commitment. Kevin Rowlands, editor of the RUSI Journal at the Royal United Services Institute, observed that planning for protective measures is underway because the world depends on oil flows from the Gulf. But he and other commentators highlighted the requirement for ongoing resources and coordination if shipping through Hormuz is to be reliably restored over weeks or months.
For markets and financial institutions, the implications are manifold. Higher energy prices can pressure consumer wallets, widen trade deficits for energy-importing countries and challenge central bank inflation targets. Disruption to fertilizer supplies threatens the agriculture sector and could feed into food price inflation, with knock-on consequences for household spending and corporate earnings across food production, distribution and retail. Shipping companies, insurers and reinsurers face heightened operational and underwriting complexity; the logistics of rerouting, war-risk insurance and potential damage claims weigh on carrier economics and balance sheets.
In short, reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a matter of assembling a flotilla. It involves confronting a range of geographic, tactical and political constraints. Short-term escorts and contingency planning are plausible and likely to materialize if the conflict endures, but establishing a durable security regime that allows unfettered commercial transit would require commitments and capabilities that many potential contributors have signalled they are unwilling to provide at present. That leaves world markets and supply chains exposed to continued volatility, at least until there is a clear political resolution or a demonstrable reduction in Iran's capacity and willingness to employ asymmetric tools in the strait.
Summary
The Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime artery for oil, gas and fertilizer, has been made unsafe by Iranian use of drones, missiles and mines following a U.S.-Israeli attack on February 28 and the killing of Iran's supreme leader. Geographic constraints, asymmetric Iranian capabilities and limited allied commitments complicate any effort to restore sustained commercial transit. Short-term naval escorts are feasible but maintaining secure passage over months would demand significant resources and political will. Disruptions risk higher oil and fertilizer prices and broader economic strain.